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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-3591 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID MORRISSEY, a/k/a David Smentkowski, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-18-cr-00454-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Renee M. Bumb 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
Monday, June 15, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and FISHER, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 16, 2020) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 David Morrissey violated the terms of his supervised release that he was serving 
for another crime. Citing his history of recidivism and need for correctional treatment, the 
District Court sentenced Morrissey to six months’ imprisonment and a new five-year 
term of supervised release. Morrissey timely appealed. Because the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it sentenced Morrissey, we will affirm.1 
 On appeal, Morrissey challenges the substantive reasonableness of his five-year 
term of supervised release. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for 
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014). 
We will affirm a sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the [sentencing] court 
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). “As long 
as a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered 
reasonable in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. 
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 “[The] District Court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a 
term of imprisonment” if it determines “that the defendant violated a condition of 
supervised release.” United States v. Bagdy, 764 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). The District Court may also impose a “term of supervised release 
 
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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. . . following a term of post-revocation imprisonment[.]” United States v. Williams, 675 
F.3d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)). 
Morrissey has a substantial criminal record and history of recidivism. In 2000, 
Morrissey pleaded guilty to an offense that subjected him to lifetime community 
supervision in New Jersey. Later, Morrissey pleaded guilty to a federal offense and was 
sentenced to eleven months and twelve days’ imprisonment, followed by five years of 
supervised release. Shortly after his release from prison, Morrissey was arrested for 
assaulting his girlfriend and therefore violated the terms of his federal supervised release. 
Morrissey pleaded guilty and faced a range of eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Because Morrissey violated his 
supervised release, the District Court had discretion to impose a term of supervised 
release up to life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), (k). The parties asked for a downward 
variance to six months’ imprisonment with no additional term of supervised release. 
The District Court then considered the § 3553(a) factors. It granted the parties’ 
request for a variance because six months’ imprisonment was enough, but not greater 
than necessary, to serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
But the District Court rejected the parties’ recommendation that Morrissey not receive a 
term of supervised release. In doing so, it cited Morrissey’s extensive history of 
recidivism and that Morrissey violated the terms of his federal supervised release shortly 
after it began. After acknowledging the restrictive terms of Morrissey’s lifetime state 
supervision, the District Court concluded that Morrissey was “just not learning his 
lesson.” App. 37. Thus, the District Court imposed a five-year term of supervised release, 
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stressing the need to provide Morrissey with “educational treatment, vocational 
training[,] or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” App. 38; see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). After Morrissey objected to the term of supervised 
release as unnecessarily punitive, the District Court disagreed and again emphasized that 
supervised release was necessary under the § 3553(a) factors. 
 Given the District Court’s thoughtful reasoning, we cannot conclude that “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Morrissey] for 
the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Rather, the District 
Court carefully considered the circumstances of Morrissey’s case and imposed a below-
range term of imprisonment and a within-range term of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 7B1.3(g)(2). “If the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, we may 
presume that the sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 
119–20 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Nothing in the record overcomes that 
presumption here. Nevertheless, Morrissey argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by unreasonably applying the § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The District 
Court’s reasoning was not “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.” United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
* * * 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
